I dont think anyone could really say anything about that because it would be Godd's own desicion. We really would have no ideas because what has happend has happend.
[quote author=epshiri link=board=1;threadid=3726;start=0#msg53111 date=1145907737] if judas din't sin and kill jesus then who would havge fullfilled the prophesies?
plz help
epshiri
Actually, Judas didn't even kill Jesus, he betrayed him, so the consequence for the betrayel is he commited suicide, and Jesus was crucified, he died, but he wasn't killed, I agree with LifeinChrist!
Your question is a puissant one. There seemingly is a dichotomy of prophetic forbearance and divine expectation. Or, to rephrase; there seems to be clash between the Divine Decree establishing that Judas will betray Christ, and the very will of God for Judas not to betray Christ. The implicit interrogation behind your question really asks; doesn't the pre-destined decree of the Almighty consign itself against the free will that Judas was endowed with? Didn’t Judas essentially have to betray Christ for God's prophesies not to be a mere sham? However, it is important that one not conflict the desire of God with the divine decree He has established before the creation of the world. Free will is by no means hindered by the knowledge God has of an event occurring. As I have written an exposition upon this matter previously, I have delineated an integrative synchronism between what I might call the Omniscience-Libertarianism dilemma. There is inadequate and unsound reason to adopt the belief that God's cognizance of an event(s) laden those events with an absolute necessity of occurrence. Simply because God knows an event will occur does not imply that the event must occur. Here is what I have written on the subject with a bit of an extensive outlook......an excerpt substantially inspired by world-renown apologist William Lane Craig:
".....the absence of free-will as it coincides with an omniscient Being needs to be re-assessed. The skeptic may purport an argument against free choice using the following reasoning and subjunctive premises; Premise1: Necessarily, if God knows P (for any contingent proposition P) then P. Premise 2: God knows P Premise 3: Necessarily, P.
Yet, this argumentative reasoning holds a common logical fallacy committed by those imbibing it. While it is true that in a deductive argument the conclusion must follow necessarily from the premises, the premises themselves are not to be ascribed with necessity. The errancy is exhumed as one carefully reviews the second and third premises. Granted, that one assumes the correctness of Preimse1, the following is what should ensue logically; Premise 1: Necessarily, if God knows P then P Premise 2: God knows P Premise 3: then P
It does not follow from Premise 1 and 2 that necessarily God knows P. All that ensues from the initial premise is the certainty one may have that P will indeed occur. The problem consists of the conflationary attempt on the part of the skeptic to mix absolute certainty with necessity. Absolute certainty is a component of the reasoning taking place while necessity is a component of the actual premise. One may be absolutely certain that an event will occur, yet the event must not be consigned to necessity of occurrence. God’s knowledge of an event, hence, does logically induce one particular outcome to any event. An event may hold a whole range of possible outcomes in different possible worlds, before the divine decree to create this world. The counter-reformation theologian Louise Melina consigned to this realization and using the Anselmian conception of God, ascribes three particular traits to God’s omniscience. According to Moulina, God posses not only knowledge of everything that could happen, but also knowledge of everything that would happen in any particular set of circumstances. This, he referred to as God’s “middle knowledge”. God’s natural knowledge is that which conceives all necessary truths, the range of all possible worlds he may have created. He knows that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances. On the other hand, God’s middle knowledge is His knowledge of all contingently true counter-factual propositions …including those of men’s free actions. For example, prior to His creative decree God knew that if Peter were in circumstances C, he would freely deny Christ three times. Counter-factual knowledge allows for God to limit the range of possible worlds; worlds that are feasible for God to actualize. There is a possible world where Peter freely affirms Christ in precisely the same circumstances he would deny him in. However, given the counter-factual truths that if Peter were in precisely those same circumstances he would freely deny Christ, then the possible world where Peter affirms Christ is not feasible for God. God could make Peter affirm Christ, but then his confession would not be free. By means of His middle knowledge God knows the proper ensemble of possible worlds which are feasible for Him, given the counterfactuals that are true. God then decrees to create men in certain circumstances and on the basis of His middle knowledge and the knowledge of His decree, God has foreknowledge of everything that will happen. Given these three characteristics, particularly knowledge of possible counter-factual truths, it logically follows that merely because God knows an event, the event is not a necessity, in regard to occurrence."
It really doesnt matter whether Judas betrayed Jesus or not, all of us do sins, but we have the choice, either to repent from them, or not. Peter denied Christ, but he didnt give up, and commit suicide, because he had hope in God's mercy and forgiveness. Judas could have repented, but he chose not to, he thought it was the end, and had no hope in God's mercy.
Another means by which to look at God's omniscience, is the mere occurrence of past events in the present. Often, we impose the timeframe of our universe upon God, imagining that He lives every moment alongside us and has not yet seen the end of our world. However, in the mindset of God, past, present and future events are unbounded by time. Whether God exists in a timeless realm or a realm of infinite time, He needs not wait moment by moment for an event to occur.
To place a foresight upon God's character where He literally "looks" in the future and therefore knows what will occur poses many problems. For, in a dynamic world like our universe how could God look into a future that does not even exist yet? Furthermore, this "perceptionist" view is terribly anthropomorphic anyhow. As such when one places a foresight in which God conceives all that will happen, hence the conceptionist view, middle knowledge and natural knowledge help to eliminate any notion of incoherence between omniscience and free will.
*Now, to simplify this resolution, one may imagine God sitting in His throne room. As He watches all that is before Him....none of the events have yet occurred. Suddenly, every event that He initiates from the start of the begging in of the universe to the end of the world happens immediately before Him. Every event happens simultaneously before Him in a moment's time. Thus, every day of our life is “Now” for Him. Since God is not restricted by time as we are, this immediate occurrence must happen all at once.
The Christian may happily concede that God does not know a man’s actions until he has have done it.....but the moment he has done it is already "Now" for God. This view espouses that our tomorrow is really God's today. Thus, the decree to create Judas, the knowledge Judas would betray Christ, and the actual betrayal by Judas all happens simultaneously at once for God. Once could hardly blame God for not preventing events that occur all at once before Him.
This is a bit different and less accurate from the first excerpt I gave in this forum. Still, it is a feasible perspective in viewing God’s omniscience. I imagine that a few or so readers may be somewhat confused by this point. If you have found this illustration too confusing or unhelpful then merely drop it. The illustration merely serves as a means for better understanding God's timeframe not a doctrine denoting the necessary truth of God's character. Yet, I hope it proves to be substantially enlightening.
[quote author=epshiri link=board=1;threadid=3726;start=0#msg53111 date=1145907737] if judas din't sin and kill jesus then who would havge fullfilled the prophesies?
plz help
epshiri
Prophecy in the sense of foretelling future events is made by God because He KNOWS they will happen. Had Judas not betrayed Jesus, He would have never said He would be betrayed.
God exists outside all space and time, to God there is no past and future, everything is present - God does not predict, He knows.
Comments
if judas din't sin and kill jesus then who would havge fullfilled the prophesies?
plz help
epshiri
Actually, Judas didn't even kill Jesus, he betrayed him, so the consequence for the betrayel is he commited suicide, and Jesus was crucified, he died, but he wasn't killed, I agree with LifeinChrist!
Forever,
Coptic Servent
However, it is important that one not conflict the desire of God with the divine decree He has established before the creation of the world. Free will is by no means hindered by the knowledge God has of an event occurring. As I have written an exposition upon this matter previously, I have delineated an integrative synchronism between what I might call the Omniscience-Libertarianism dilemma. There is inadequate and unsound reason to adopt the belief that God's cognizance of an event(s) laden those events with an absolute necessity of occurrence. Simply because God knows an event will occur does not imply that the event must occur. Here is what I have written on the subject with a bit of an extensive outlook......an excerpt substantially inspired by world-renown apologist William Lane Craig:
".....the absence of free-will as it coincides with an omniscient Being needs to be re-assessed. The skeptic may purport an argument against free choice using the following reasoning and subjunctive premises;
Premise1: Necessarily, if God knows P (for any contingent proposition P)
then P.
Premise 2: God knows P
Premise 3: Necessarily, P.
Yet, this argumentative reasoning holds a common logical fallacy committed by those imbibing it. While it is true that in a deductive argument the conclusion must follow necessarily from the premises, the premises themselves are not to be ascribed with necessity. The errancy is exhumed as one carefully reviews the second and third premises. Granted, that one assumes the correctness of Preimse1, the following is what should ensue logically;
Premise 1: Necessarily, if God knows P then P
Premise 2: God knows P
Premise 3: then P
It does not follow from Premise 1 and 2 that necessarily God knows P. All that ensues from the initial premise is the certainty one may have that P will indeed occur. The problem consists of the conflationary attempt on the part of the skeptic to mix absolute certainty with necessity. Absolute certainty is a component of the reasoning taking place while necessity is a component of the actual premise. One may be absolutely certain that an event will occur, yet the event must not be consigned to necessity of occurrence.
God’s knowledge of an event, hence, does logically induce one particular outcome to any event. An event may hold a whole range of possible outcomes in different possible worlds, before the divine decree to create this world. The counter-reformation theologian Louise Melina consigned to this realization and using the Anselmian conception of God, ascribes three particular traits to God’s omniscience. According to Moulina, God posses not only knowledge of everything that could happen, but also knowledge of everything that would happen in any particular set of circumstances. This, he referred to as God’s “middle knowledge”. God’s natural knowledge is that which conceives all necessary truths, the range of all possible worlds he may have created. He knows that in some possible world Peter freely denies Christ three times and that in another world Peter freely affirms Christ under identical circumstances.
On the other hand, God’s middle knowledge is His knowledge of all contingently true counter-factual propositions …including those of men’s free actions. For example, prior to His creative decree God knew that if Peter were in circumstances C, he would freely deny Christ three times. Counter-factual knowledge allows for God to limit the range of possible worlds; worlds that are feasible for God to actualize. There is a possible world where Peter freely affirms Christ in precisely the same circumstances he would deny him in. However, given the counter-factual truths that if Peter were in precisely those same circumstances he would freely deny Christ, then the possible world where Peter affirms Christ is not feasible for God. God could make Peter affirm Christ, but then his confession would not be free.
By means of His middle knowledge God knows the proper ensemble of possible worlds which are feasible for Him, given the counterfactuals that are true. God then decrees to create men in certain circumstances and on the basis of His middle knowledge and the knowledge of His decree, God has foreknowledge of everything that will happen. Given these three characteristics, particularly knowledge of possible counter-factual truths, it logically follows that merely because God knows an event, the event is not a necessity, in regard to occurrence."
God bless.
To place a foresight upon God's character where He literally "looks" in the future and therefore knows what will occur poses many problems. For, in a dynamic world like our universe how could God look into a future that does not even exist yet? Furthermore, this "perceptionist" view is terribly anthropomorphic anyhow. As such when one places a foresight in which God conceives all that will happen, hence the conceptionist view, middle knowledge and natural knowledge help to eliminate any notion of incoherence between omniscience and free will.
*Now, to simplify this resolution, one may imagine God sitting in His throne room. As He watches all that is before Him....none of the events have yet occurred. Suddenly, every event that He initiates from the start of the begging in of the universe to the end of the world happens immediately before Him. Every event happens simultaneously before Him in a moment's time. Thus, every day of our life is “Now” for Him. Since God is not restricted by time as we are, this immediate occurrence must happen all at once.
The Christian may happily concede that God does not know a man’s actions until he has have done it.....but the moment he has done it is already "Now" for God. This view espouses that our tomorrow is really God's today. Thus, the decree to create Judas, the knowledge Judas would betray Christ, and the actual betrayal by Judas all happens simultaneously at once for God. Once could hardly blame God for not preventing events that occur all at once before Him.
This is a bit different and less accurate from the first excerpt I gave in this forum. Still, it is a feasible perspective in viewing God’s omniscience. I imagine that a few or so readers may be somewhat confused by this point. If you have found this illustration too confusing or unhelpful then merely drop it. The illustration merely serves as a means for better understanding God's timeframe not a doctrine denoting the necessary truth of God's character. Yet, I hope it proves to be substantially enlightening.
God Bless.
if judas din't sin and kill jesus then who would havge fullfilled the prophesies?
plz help
epshiri
Prophecy in the sense of foretelling future events is made by God because He KNOWS they will happen. Had Judas not betrayed Jesus, He would have never said He would be betrayed.
God exists outside all space and time, to God there is no past and future, everything is present - God does not predict, He knows.