Fr. Robert Barron on "Why What You Believe Matters":
Transcript:
A team of sociologists lead by William D'Antonio who is a professor at Catholic university just published a survey that's got a lot of media attention because it shows that there's this disconnect between people's beliefs in Catholic doctrine and people's sense of their viability as Catholics. I'll give you one example, 40% of people in the survey evidently said that they don't accept the doctrine of the real presence of Jesus in the Eucharist which is a pretty basic Catholic doctrine and still say but we're good faithful Catholics. The one that got my attention though was 88%, an overwhelming majority of people said that what really matters is being a good person.
It's what you do matters not so much what you believe. There was a follow up to this in the Chicago Sun Times and they talked to a Catholic on the street who said it's what's in my heart that matters not so much what the church teaches. Again, I was struck by this falling apart between doctrine and ethics, doctrine and practice and the clear favoring of ethics over doctrine. If you want to trace this back historically you can do it pretty easily by looking at the work of Immanuel Kant the 18th century German philosopher.
Kant famously said in his book called Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, he said look religion comes down to ethics. That's what it's fundamentally about. Doctrines, dogmas, liturgies and all that are fine in the measure that the contribute to good ethical behavior. If they don't they're irrelevant at best, problematic at worst. Kant drove a wedge between doctrine and ethics. I would dare say many people in the west and see this survey reflects it. Many people in the west would agree with that instinctually.
They'd say deep down what matters is are you a good person? Then what you believe, that's kind of up to you and that's more subjective. What really matters is are you a good person. Okay, see what I think is really dangerous, I'm not with Immanuel Kant. I think what's really dangerous is precisely this bifurcation. Driving this wedge between doctrine and practice and here's why. Without knowing it a lot of the ethical practices are in fact grounded in fundamental doctrines. When the doctrines become marginalized or rejected or when we have a caviler attitude about them in fact we are undermining many of these ethical directives.
Let me try to show it, I think you can show it in a lot of ways but just in a couple of ways. Being a good person, I bet most people would say that means that you're a person of love. You're a loving person, that's what it means to be good. That's what they'd look to. That's the criteria, is that a person of love? What is love? Love is as I've said very often is not a feeling or a sentiment, not a private subjective conviction. Love is willing the good of the other as other. Meaning love gets you out of this black hole of your own subjectivity, your own egocentrism. If I'm kind to you that you might be kind to me that isn't love, that's just indirect egotism.
If I say I'll be just to you that you'll be just to me in return that isn't love that's just a sort of clever way to be self interested. What's love? Love is a very peculiar thing, not just many splendors a very peculiar thing too because it means I've broken free of that self reference. I want your good for you, period. No strings attached. No reciprocation required. The church has said traditionally that love so described is a theological virtue. Aristotle didn't recognize love. That wasn't one of the virtues that he recognized.
The church identifies love as I've been describing it as a participation in God's way of being. God who has no need. God is God, God is perfect, absolute. God has no need therefore God alone can truly want the good of the other for the sake of the other. God can operate in a totally non-self interested way. When we do that, when we're capable of that it's only because we've received an infusion of grace. We've received a participation in God's own life. Here's the problem. Get rid of God or language about God or the doctrines that describe God, in time that love that I've been describing will also be attenuated. It will also even us.
Love that we so admire in the ethical order is a theological reality described by doctrinal truths. That's the more subjective side of the equation. Now look at the objective side. We say to love is to respect the dignity and the freedom and the inherent worth of every individual no matter of gender, background, race, education. Every human person we say, decent people would say, is worthy of this sort of infinite respect. We take that for granted but think about it. Why is that self evidently true? I would argue it's really not self evidently true. What makes it true is a theological doctrine that every person has been created by God and destined for eternal life.
That's why the person is properly seen as the subject of rights, freedom, dignity, equality and inherent worth. If you doubt me take away God from the equation. Take God out of consideration what do you get? Look back at classical times. Would Aristotle or Plato or Cicero have thought that each individual person, every person is the subject of rights, freedom, dignity, infinite worth? Absolutely not. For the classical philosophers a handful of people, the aristocrats, the virtuous, the well educated were the subject of rights and freedom and so on. The vast majority of people Plato, Aristotle, Cicero thought should do what they're told. More to it a lot of them felt that children who were malformed should be exposed to the elements, left to die.
A huge number of people in the classical world were slaves and the great philosophers thought that was natural. Many people were naturally destined for slavery. Now fast forward to more contemporary times. Look at the great totalitarianisms of the last century where God was systematically denied so go to Soviet Russia, go to Hitler's Germany, go to Mao China etc. What do you find? You find tens of millions of corpses. Lenin put it very succinctly didn't he? You want to make an omelet you've got to break a few eggs. The idea there was hey you want to produce this perfect communist society well, you've got to kill some people. Every person's the subject of infinite right, freedom, dignity worth? No way, on the contrary.
Is there perhaps a little connection between the explicit systematic atheism of these regimes and this attitude? Yes. It seems to me it's very hard to deny it. When you deny certain doctrines like the doctrine of creation. The doctrine of God's existence then love begins to disappear rather quickly. Oh no, that would never happen. You bet it will happen. It happened in our own life time. It happened in the lifetimes of our parents and grandparents. The point is this is a dangerous business when we drive Kant's wedge between doctrine and ethics. When we say so blithely oh it doesn't really matter what you believe it's the kind of person you are. The kind of person you are if by that you mean a person of love depends very much, depends radically upon certain key doctrines. That's why doctrine matters precisely because we want to be people of love.
Comments
Qawe,
Even if love is axiomatic from an experiential pov, it can still be explained by its benefits. Species thrive more on altruism than on individuality. Thus a whole communion is better fit to survive more and give more offspring based on helping and loving one another. We can also neurobiologically explain love as well.
"Consider the evolutionary psychologist’s explanation of altruism as we find it delicately and passionately expounded by Matt Ridley in his book The Origins of Virtue. Ridley plausibly suggests that moral virtue and the habit of obedience to what Kant called the moral law is an adaptation, his evidence being that any other form of conduct would have set an organism’s genes at a distinct disadvantage in the game of life. To use the language of game theory, in the circumstances that have prevailed during the course of evolution, altruism is a dominant strategy. This was shown by John Maynard Smith in a paper first published in 1964, and taken up by Robert Axelrod in his famous book "The Evolution of Cooperation," which appeared in 1984. But what exactly do those writers mean by “altruism”?
An organism acts altruistically, they tell us, if it benefits another organism at a cost to itself. The concept applies equally to the soldier ant that marches into the flames that threaten the anthill, and to the officer who throws himself onto the live grenade that threatens his platoon. The concept of altruism, so understood, cannot explain, or even recognize, the distinction between those two cases. Yet surely there is all the difference in the world between the ant that marches instinctively toward the flames, unable either to understand what it is doing or to fear the results of it, and the officer who consciously lays down his life for his troops.
If Kant is right, a rational being has a motive to obey the moral law, regardless of genetic advantage. This motive would arise, even if the normal result of following it were that which the Greeks observed with awe at Thermopylae, or the Anglo-Saxons at the Battle of Maldon. In such instances an entire community is observed to embrace death, in full consciousness of what it is doing, because death is the honorable option. Even if you don’t think Kant’s account of this is the right one, the fact is that this motive is universally observed in human beings, and is entirely distinct from that of the soldier ant, in being founded on a consciousness of the predicament, of the cost of doing right, and of the call to renounce life for the sake of others who depend on you or to whom your life is owed.
To put it in another way, on the approach of the evolutionary psychologists, the conduct of the Spartans at Thermopylae is overdetermined. The “dominant reproductive strategy” explanation, and the “honorable sacrifice” explanation are both sufficient to account for this conduct. So which is the real explanation? Or is the “honorable sacrifice” explanation just a story that we tell ourselves, in order to pin medals on the chest of the ruined “survival machine” that died in obedience to its genes?
But suppose that the moral explanation is genuine and sufficient. It would follow that the genetic explanation is trivial. If rational beings are motivated to behave in this way, regardless of any genetic strategy, then that is sufficient to explain the fact that they do behave in this way. And being disposed to behave in this way is an adaptation— for all this means is that people who were disposed by nature to behave in any other way would by now have died out, regardless of the reasons they might have had for behaving as they did.
This brings us again to the parallel with mathematics that I discussed in the first chapter. We can easily show that mathematical competence is an adaptation. But that says nothing about the distinction between valid and invalid proofs, and it won’t give us a grasp of mathematical reasoning. There is an internal discipline involved here, which will not be illuminated by any amount of psychology, just as there is an internal discipline of moral thinking, which leads of its own accord to the conclusion that a given action is obligatory. Of course, it is a further fact about human beings that they are disposed to do what they think they ought to do. But it is the moral judgment, rather than some blind instinct, that compels them. The parallel is not exact. But it illustrates the way in which evolutionary explanations reduce to triviality, when the thing to be explained contains its own principles of persuasion.
Moreover, like mathematics, moral thinking unfolds before us a view of the world that transcends the deliverances of the senses, and which it is hard to explain as the by-product of evolutionary competition. Moral judgments are framed in the language of necessity, and no corner of our universe escapes their jurisdiction. Morality provides another example of the way in which intentionality “reaches beyond” the order of nature, relating us in thought to the cosmos as a whole. And morality makes sense only if there are reasons for action that are normative and binding. It is hard to accept this, and still to resist the conclusion drawn by Thomas Nagel, that the universe is ordered by teleological laws."
Roger Scruton, The Soul of the World, 54-56.
But doesn't a teleological argument lead to the idea of the watchmaker god which the deists argued for?
God's approach in dealing with His people in the Old Testament differs than the New Testament because we now have the Holy Spirit Who teaches us. It's kind of like a young child who needs specific, strict directions but once he/she grows up, the rules change to meet his/her needs. So it's not that things are contradicting, it's that we, as humans, are changing in mentality.. so we need different laws :)
Did I answer correctly? Lol
Also is there an examination you're posting after this?